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ABSTRACT
As marine-ice around Antarctica retracts, a vast ‘blue carbon’ sink, in the form of living
biomass, is emerging. Properly protected and promoted Antarctic blue carbon will
form the world’s largest natural negative feedback on climate change. However,
fulﬁlling this promise may be challenging, given the uniqueness of the region and
the legal systems that govern it. In this interdisciplinary study, we explain: the
global signiﬁcance of Antarctic blue carbon to international carbon mitigation
eﬀorts; the urgent need for international legal protections for areas where it is
emerging; and the hurdles that need to be overcome to realize those goals. In
order to progress conservation eﬀorts past political blockages we recommend the
development of an inter-instrument governance framework that quantiﬁes the
sequestration value of Antarctic blue carbon for attribution to states’ climate
mitigation commitments under the 2015 Paris Agreement.
Key policy insights
. Blue-carbon emergence around Antarctica’s coastlines will potentially store up to
160,000,000 tonnes of carbon annually.
. Blue-carbon will emerge in areas of rich biomass that will make it vulnerable to
harvesting and other human activities; it is essential to incentivise conserving,
rather than commercial exploitation of newly ice-free areas of the Southern Ocean.
. Antarctic blue carbon is a practical and prime candidate to build a cooperative,
inter-instrument, non-market mitigation around; this should be considered at the
‘blue COP’ UN Climate change discussions in Spain.
. Allowing Antarctic ﬁshing states to account for the carbon storage value of blue
carbon zones through a non-market approach under the Paris Agreement could
provide a vital incentive to their protection under the Antarctic Treaty System.
. The Scientiﬁc Committee on Antarctic Research would be the ideal body to
facilitate the necessary connections between the relevant climate and Antarctic
governance regimes.
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Introduction
As marine-ice around Antarctica retracts a vast sink of ‘blue carbon’ (carbon captured and stored by marine eco-
systems (Nellemann & Corcora, 2009, p. 19)) in the form of living biomass is emerging. Properly promoted and
protected, continental shelf blue carbon promises to act as a rebound buﬀer by forming the world’s largest
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natural negative feedback on climate change. However, fulﬁlling this promise may prove challenging, given the
uniqueness of the region and the legal systems that govern it.
Antarctica is globally unique as a space dedicated to international cooperation where countries have put
their territorial claims ‘on hold’ and therefore no one state is able to exercise sovereign rights over ﬁsheries.
As a result, marine ecosystems are governed by consensus under the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). That
system is heavily conservation focused, but it does envision and permit ‘rational use’ (harvesting) of marine
living resources in the Southern Ocean. Eﬀorts to implement precautionary conservation measures for emergent
Antarctic blue carbon zones will therefore likely face resistance from states that ﬁsh, or plan to ﬁsh, oﬀ Antarctic
coasts. Indeed, the sheer size and scale of marine ice-loss and the resulting biodiversity rich zones that will
emerge there suggest a rush to exploit, not protect these critical natural carbon sinks.
In this paper, we explore one possible way of shifting the cost–beneﬁt calculus of ﬁshing states away
from exploitation towards conservation of Antarctic blue carbon. Speciﬁcally, we encourage the
exploration of an inter-instrument framework for Antarctic blue carbon accounting and attribution. This
would permit states to account for conservation activities in blue carbon zones as part of their nationally deter-
mined contributions (NDCs) under the 2015 Paris Agreement. Indeed, under Paris’ parent convention, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992), Article IV (1) (d), states are committed to:
promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases
… including biomass… oceans… coastal and marine ecosystems.
The protection and promotion of Antarctic blue carbon clearly ﬁts within the scope of this international legal
obligation. It is also a suitable international cooperative exercise that would form the ideal basis for a workable
non market approach to climate change mitigation. Establishing such a platform would provide a commensu-
rate incentive for the long term conservation of vital emerging ecosystems in the Southern Ocean. The colla-
borative achievement of these existential imperatives is consistent with the philosophy and governance
approach of both climate and Antarctic regime systems and in the interests of all states.
This paper proceeds as follows:
. First, we explore how climate change is aﬀecting Antarctica’s coasts, namely through ice-shelf retraction and
the emergence of blue carbon in ice-free zones.
. Second, we explain the need for and challenges to extending legal protections over this important carbon
sink.
. Third, we consider the source of regime blockages within the present Antarctic governance system and how
they may be overcome through concessional incentive measures.
. Finally, we suggest a way to generate conservation incentives for the protection of Antarctic Blue carbon for
the protection of the global climate system by linking the Antarctic governance regime with the Climate one.
There would, unquestionably, be diplomatic, technical and legal hurdles to realizing such an outcome. Some
of which we will raise and discuss here – all deserve further attention and work. However, the legal and environ-
mental conditions have aligned to make the exploration of such a governance platform for Antarctic blue
carbon sequestration both timely and essential. Given the existential threat of climate change there is much
more to gain than lose in the attempt.
Climate change, blue carbon and Antarctica’s coasts
Approximately three quarters of Antarctica’s coastline is bounded by continental ice sheets that extend seaward
from the Antarctic landmass into the Southern Ocean (Rignot, Jacobs, Mouginot, & Scheuchl, 2013). On broad
geological timescales, the Antarctic ice-shelf volume has been relatively stable. However, decadal time-series
data show rapid and unexpected reductions in Antarctic sea ice volume linked to climate change (Greene, Blan-
kenship, Gwyther, Silvano, & Wijk, 2017; Rintoul et al., 2018). The eﬀects of this extreme mass loss are varied, but
it has already led to the retreat, collapse and calving of large portions of West Antarctic continental ice-shelves,
which are in an accelerating rate of decline. Volumetric thinning of the East Antarctic sheet (Lenaerts et al., 2016)
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has also been predicted to generate a ‘trigger point’ whereby the shelf stability becomes undermined and fails
to form a barrier for glacial meltwater from the grounded ice it holds back (Lenaerts et al., 2016). Continued
unabated warming could result in accelerating the breakup of the Eastern ice sheet as well as the Western
one (Deconto & Pollard, 2016; Golledge et al., 2019; Rignot et al., 2019).
While our understanding of these changes in Antarctica is developing, it has become clear that our response
must not only be an exercise in adapting to their consequences, but also to take advantage of new opportunities
for climate change mitigation. That is because of the potential for life in the permanently ice-free areas of ocean
to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and bury some of it permanently on the seaﬂoor – creating a
huge blue carbon sink.
The emergence of Antarctic blue carbon and its role in carbon storage, and eventually sequestration is
complex and still being explored. Figure 1 provides an overview of the process, important concepts and
terms. In summary, as marine ice decreases in any spatial zone, its ability to absorb carbon dioxide increases,
in part due to the replacement of high albedo ice with seawater (Stammerjohn, Martinson, Smith, & Iannuzzi,
2008), but also as a result of the succession of biological organisms into newly ice-shelf free zones and increased
growth in zones of sea ice loss (Peck, Barnes, Cook, Fleming, & Clarke, 2009). Where this succession becomes per-
manent, carbon storage on the seaﬂoor begins. This is motivated by the transfer of atmospheric carbon, through
organisms in the water column, into the skeletons and tissues of zoobenthic organisms (animals living on the
seabed) and eventually buried in shelf sediments. In this context ‘carbon storage’ involves a whole-of-ecosystem
process, which transfers carbon via the food-chain to the animals on the seaﬂoor (termed benthos). This process
results in ocean life forming a major carbon reservoir, referred to as ‘blue-carbon’, which is the most rapidly
increasing carbon store and negative feedback on climate on the planet (Nellemann & Corcora, 2009, p. 19).
Antarctic continental shelves are very large and in deeper water experience uniquely minimal levels of
(anthropogenic or natural) disturbance, making them particularly eﬀective as carbon sinks (Barnes, 2015,
2017; Barnes, Fleming, Sands, Quartino, & Deregibus, 2018). Climate change may amplify this potential
(Turner & Comiso, 2017), in part through the natural increase in the abundance and longevity of phytoplankton
where sea-ice is being lost over shallow continental shelf waters [see ﬁgure 2]. Further, the loss of more perma-
nent ice-shelves and glacier retreat permits colonization of whole benthic (seabed) assemblages, including
sedentary and sessile animals (for instance corals, sponges and bryozoans). The result is a profound increase
in the ecological diversity and capacity of the system to accumulate blue carbon, in a similar manner to the for-
estry term of a carbon-stock (Barnes et al., 2018).
The need for legal protection of Antarctic blue carbon
Maximizing the carbon sequestration potential of Antarctic polar blue carbon would have profound beneﬁts for
global climate mitigation eﬀorts. The emergence of blue carbon ecosystems around Antarctica is expected to
store as much as 80 million tonnes of carbon per year from the atmosphere; little work has been undertaken
on sub-Antarctic continental shelves but blue carbon gains may prove to be in excess of 160 million tonnes
(Barnes et al., 2018). However, realizing the mitigation potential of blue carbon will require a precautionary,
whole-of-ecosystem approach; especially in the newly ice-free areas. Indeed, our current state of knowledge
suggests that the negative feedback potential of newly ice-free coastal regions around the Antarctic continent
justiﬁes a commercial harvesting moratorium for these areas.
Governance of Antarctic coastlines
The terrestrial and marine systems south of latitude 60° South are governed by the Antarctic Treaty System
(ATS), of which the 1959 Antarctic Treaty is the cornerstone. (Haward, 2016) The Antarctic Treaty was established,
in part, to diﬀuse cold war tensions about the territorial status of Antarctica (Haward & Cooper, 2012). This was
achieved by states agreeing to put their territorial claims ‘on-hold’ for the duration of the Treaty (Antarctic
Treaty, Art IV(1)). States have subsequently committed to cooperatively using and governing the continent in
the interests of peace, science and international cooperation. None of those acts may prejudice any asserted,
assumed or contested sovereignty there. This cooperative, scientiﬁc approach was advanced further under
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the 1991 ATS Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol). Parties to the
Madrid Protocol agree to preserve Antarctica as a ‘natural reserve’ devoted to peaceful scientiﬁc exploration
for the progress of all humanity. (Madrid Protocol, Art 2/Preamble) However these protections are less stringent
in the marine areas surrounding the Antarctic continent.
Figure 1. Antarctic Blue-carbon Cycle. A graphical representation of the Antarctic Blue Carbon Cycle from carbon capture to sequestration on the
seaﬂoor.
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Fishing oﬀ Antarctica’s coasts
When the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated in the late 1950s, there already an existing, and long-standing, ﬁshing
industry operating in the Southern Ocean (Tin et al., 2008). To assuage concerns about the impact of territorial
concessions on ﬁshing rights, the parties agreed that the Antarctic Treaty would not aﬀect high seas rights
within the Treaty Area. Art VI of the Antarctic Treaty clariﬁes that its jurisdiction applies to:
the area south of 60 ° South Latitude, including all ice-shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any
way aﬀect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within
that area.
Figure 2 Trends in blue carbon (squares) and sea ice change: Overview: Red = sea ice loss and blue carbon gain; Blue = sea ice gain, blue carbon
loss; White? = results pending. Description: 3° × 3° cells are coloured to indicate increasing standing stock of carbon (yellows to red), decreased
standing stock due to likelihood of giant iceberg scouring of the sea ﬂoor (light to dark blue), and regions where sampling has occurred but
results pending (white with question marks). The shading indicates annual change in sea-ice duration around Antarctica where the scale −4
to + 4 relates to the average number of days lost or gained per year (respectively) of sea ice from 1979 to 2012.
Source: Sea ice data taken from Cavalierie et al. ‘Sea Ice Concentrations from Nimbus-7 SMMR and DMSP SSM/I-SSMIS Passive Microwave Data, Version 1’ Data set
1996 to present, updated annually DOI: 10.5067/8GQ8LZQVL0VL. Figure adapted from: Barnes et al. (2018).
CLIMATE POLICY 5
The Madrid Protocol adheres to this jurisdictional delimitation, eﬀectively limiting its natural reserve protections
to areas that are not ‘the high seas’ areas within the Treaty Area (Madrid Protocol, Arts 1(b) & 4). However, this
creates legal uncertainty in Antarctic circumpolar waters, because high seas are deﬁned under international law
as those marine areas not falling within the territory, jurisdiction or sovereignty of any one state (Convention on
the High Seas, 1958, Arts 1, 2 & 86).
Some states whose territorial claims precede the Antarctic Treaty (i.e. ‘claimant states’) have made qualiﬁed
declarations extending their on-hold territorial claims to circumpolar waters (Kaye & Rothwell, 2002). However,
the status of these claims remains untested and unenforced beyond the act of registration (Rothwell, 2002). As
Joyner (2009) explains:
claimant states are not pushing application of their domestic laws establishing these [maritime] zones on other governments
involved in Antarctic aﬀairs. Non-claimant states generally do not recognise the validity of any of these maritime claims, pri-
marily because they believe that no true coastal states are present and no ‘new’ claims are permitted under the Antarctic
Treaty. Most states regard circumpolar waters legally as high seas.
Thus, while it may be technically incorrect to describe the marine areas seaward of the Antarctic continental ice
sheet as ‘high seas’, the result is practically the same. That is, for activities such as ﬁshing, the natural reserve
protections of the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid Protocol practically extend only to the edge of the Antarctic
coastline.
The governance of circumpolar waters and marine ecosystems
While Antarctic circumpolar waters are not aﬀorded the same protections as terrestrial systems, they are
managed under other ATS instruments. Notably the 1980 ATS Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Article 1, provides for the conservation of Antarctic Marine Resources:
of the area south of 60° South latitude… and the Antarctic Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem.
By ascribing its subject matter-jurisdiction to biological and marine ecosystems– territorially conﬁned by a
northern boundary line of the Antarctic convergence – the CCAMLR artfully avoids upsetting the on-hold
status of territorial claims under the Antarctic Treaty. In fact, Art IV of the CCAMLR aﬃrms that no actions
made pursuant to the CCAMLR amount to a claim or denial of territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty
area. By ﬁxing only a northern boundary, and limiting its subject matter to marine ecosystems only, the Conven-
tion’s eﬀective southern jurisdictional boundary is the perimeter of the Antarctic coastline, that is, the edge of
the continental ice sheet or Antarctica’s physical landmass.
Whilst CCAMLR’s primary objective is the ‘conservation of Antarctic Marine Resources’ (Article II), unlike the
Antarctic Treaty, that conservation includes ‘rational use’ of those resources; that is, harvesting of marine
resources and associated activities. This provides a point of distinction with the treatment of the continental
terrestrial system as a nature reserve under the Madrid Protocol. In other words, the blue-carbon that
emerges following ice shelf loss becomes legally accessible to commercial harvesting precisely at the time
when its growth is so important to carbon capture, storage and ultimately sequestration.
CCAMLR management of Antarctic marine living resources
As noted, CCAMLR adopts a conservation-focused approach to ﬁshing in the Southern Ocean, aiming for the
protection and preservation of marine species and the marine environment through an ecosystem-based
and precautionary management approach. Indeed, CCAMLR contains a range of tools which can be deployed
to conserve Antarctic blue carbon zones.1 However, such conservation measures may only be formulated
and adopted by reference to the primary objects and principles set out in Article II of the Convention, namely:
(1) stock maintenance (stability of recruitment); (Art II(3)(a))
(2) ecological relationship maintenance; (Art II(3)(b)) and
(3) intergenerationally sustained conservation. (Art II(3)(c))
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Notably, the objects and principles set out in Article II are all deﬁned in relation to Antarctic marine living
resources (Art II(1),(3), Art V(2), Art IX). That Article, and its implementation as conservation measures, makes
no reference to the protection or conservation of the ecosystem outside of the treaty area. Indeed, climate
change is not mentioned anywhere in the CCAMLR text. That is, perhaps, understandable given the time
period and regional and global context in which it was drafted; climate change was not a factor that dominated
international relations or ﬁsheries management negotiations.2 As a result the impact of marine conservation on
climate change, the atmosphere and global environment were not included in the Convention text as some-
thing upon which conservation measures can be established. Only the conservation and maintenance of the
marine environment of the Southern Ocean is relevant.
The south-looking focus of the CCAMLR is reﬂected in the primary declaration on climate made within that
body: Resolution 30/XXVIII of 2009 (CCAMLR, 2009). That resolution declares that:
climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing the Southern Ocean… [which] will continue to warm over this century
… experience increased acidiﬁcation with possible impacts on its marine ecosystems… management action can help build
resilience and protect the unique Southern Ocean environment against potentially irreversible impacts of climate change, and
ensure the continued conservation and rational use of the Antarctic marine living resources.
To this end, Resolution 30/XXVIII urges ‘consideration’ of climate change impacts on CCAMLR management (i.e.
rational use). It further encourages the collection of data about climate change as part of research activities to be
‘communicated’ to other international bodies. However, the Resolution stops short of calling for conservation
measures within the Treaty Area for the purposes of reducing the impacts of climate change outside of it.
In 2011, the CCAMLR parties did appear to move towards a more global view of conservation measures in the
implementationof aMarineProtectedArea (MPA) Framework,with theaimof conservingmarinebiodiversity in the
ConventionArea (CCAMLR, 2011; Christian, 2018). TheConventionMeasure establishing theMPAnetwork doesnot
explicitly refer to Resolution 30/XXVIII. However, it does envision the network being established ‘on the basis of the
best available scientiﬁc evidence’ to achieve, inter alia, ‘theprotectionof areas tomaintain resilience or the ability to
adapt to the eﬀects of climate change’ (Para. 2(vi)). Again, this is somewhat inward looking. Indeed, the wider res-
olution text is addressed to fostering resilience and adaptability only within the ‘Convention Area’.
Despite the ostensible jurisdictional limitations of CCAMLR, there is a clear relationship between the global
climate andAntarcticMarine ecosystem. Yet, to date, there seems to be little appetite within CCAMLR for establish-
ing conservationmeasures within the Convention by reference to their contribution to the ecosystem outside of it.
In fact, absent appropriate incentives for states, reliance on considerations not expressly provided for in the Con-
vention is likely to form thebasis foropposition, rather than consensus to cooperative conservationmeasures. Legal
uncertainties or technical impediments have often been a lens for opposition that is more properly explained by
concerns over the loss of ﬁshing rights (Jacquet, Blood-Patterson, Brooks, Ainley,2016; Nyman, 2018).
CCAMLR operates upon consensus decision-making, which is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by states with active
ﬁshing interests in the Southern Ocean (Brooks, 2013). Beyond this is the traditional convention of using
MPAs to protect speciﬁc zones, strata, activities or species therein. While proposing large moratorium zones
is not unheard of (CCAMLR, 2012), acceptance of such proposals is uncommon. These factors have served to
slow implementation of the comprehensive MPA regime envisioned in 2011, even when proposals have
clearly been designed to protect vital Antarctic ecosystems (Brooks et al., 2016). Russia and China have been
especially strident in this regard, opposing the establishment of MPAs in areas of rich biodiversity. This is
largely a result of concerns about the impact of the measures on present and future ﬁshing rights (Jabour &
Smith, 2018; Jacquet, Blood-Patterson, Brooks, & Ainley, 2016; Nyman, 2018).
Importantly though, not all MPA proposals have failed to achieve consensus within the CCAMLR, the most
notable exceptions perhaps being proposals to conserve 94,000/km2 around the South Orkneys and 1.55 m/
km2 of the Ross Sea (Barnes et al., 2015). However, it is generally understood that these were successful
because the speciﬁc zones were drawn so as to avoid current or future commercial harvesting interests. For
instance, China, which originally opposed the Ross Sea MPA, only agreed to it after a krill-ﬁshing zone was
carved out –despite not actually engaging in krill ﬁshing at the time (Jabour & Smith, 2018; Nyman, 2018, note 46).
Similar concessional balancing between commercial and conservation values has also led to the adoption of
more temporary protection measures for new ice-free zones within the Southern Ocean. These include the 2017
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agreement by the CCAMLR parties to implement a ten-year ‘Special Area for Scientiﬁc Study’ (SASS) over ‘newly
exposed marine areas around the Antarctic Peninsula and Larsen C Ice Shelf following ice-shelf retreat or col-
lapse’ (CCAMLR, 2017). However, this was adopted upon the caveat that the SASS only limits (not prohibits) har-
vesting while data is gathered to ‘understand the ecosystem processes in relation to climate change’.
Furthermore the SASS is directed to determining how the area may be ‘rationally used’ – rather than conserved
– in the future. Thus, whilst the SASS may provide a much better understanding of the carbon sequestration
potential of the relevant areas it retains a focus on long-term harvesting.
Madrid protocol
An alternative source of potential blue carbon protection within the ATS regime complex is the Madrid Protocol.
While technically the Antarctic Treaty does not extend to the high seas areas oﬀ – or practically at the verge of –
the edge of ice sheets, it does allow the parties to extend its reach into these areas. Speciﬁcally, the Protocol
aﬃrms that the high seas is to remain a regulated ﬁshery, but allows the parties to create Antarctic Specially
Protected Areas (ASPAs) anywhere within the Treaty Area ‘including any marine area’ (Annex V, Art 2). Unlike
the CCAMLR conservation measures, ASPAs may be established based on their ‘outstanding environmental
[or] scientiﬁc’ value, without reference to the Antarctic ecosystem. This would be wide enough to include the
beneﬁt of preserving Antarctic blue carbon for the global climate system. Unfortunately, there are also chal-
lenges to using the ASPA system to protect coastal blue carbon.
The ﬁrst challenge is that the ASPA system is relatively underutilized and politicized (Shaw, Terauds, Riddle,
Possingham, & Chown, 2014). Only of 1.5% Antarctic biodiversity regions are covered by ASPAs, which is 10% of
the global average for regional biodiversity conservation (Hughes, Ireland, Convey, & Fleming, 2015).3 Most of
these are designed to protect (predominantly) terrestrial rather than marine systems, (Douglass et al., 2014) and
are largely centred around the bases of nominating parties.4 That has led some critics to suggest that they are
being used as geopolitical tools to support the on-hold territorial claims to the continent, should such claims
need to be revived (Hughes & Grant, 2017).
The second, more challenging, issue is that, despite the fact that ASPAs are not limited by the subject
matter jurisdiction of CCAMLR, that body must provide ‘prior approval’ for any ASPA in marine areas.
(Madrid Protocol, Annex V, Art 6(2)) In one way, this is beneﬁcial, insofar as it leverages the specialist
marine science expertise in that regime. On the other hand, it serves to infuse the decision-making
process under the Madrid Protocol with the commercial considerations present within CCAMLR – especially
concerns about locking-up protein rich areas of biodiversity. Indeed, despite its technical capacity, and a
general consensus amongst the parties that CCAMLR should take the lead in nominating marine ASPAs, it
has not done so to date. (Hughes & Grant, 2018). Indeed, very few ASPAs have any form of marine
component at all.5 Thus, while ASPAs provide suitable, technically compliant, alternatives to MPAs as a
source of blue carbon protection under the ATS – especially those adjacent to the territorial coastline of Ant-
arctica – they may face similar geopolitical obstacles to implementation.
Regardless of the legal vehicle adopted, commitment to conservation of marine based Antarctic blue carbon
must necessarily come from within, and be driven by, CCAMLR. Recent history suggests a failure to reach con-
sensus if conservation measures are framed solely around conservation. Antarctic marine ecosystems are con-
sidered a commodity by some key ATS states. Proposals to protect such ecosystems must, pragmatically, take
account of such ﬁshing interests, or ﬁnd ways of generating alternative non-commercial incentives that are con-
sidered as equitable by all CCAMLR parties. As Brooks et al. (2016) note:
Past conservation successes in CCAMLR depended on having an open political window of opportunity, trust within the Com-
mission, and alignment of incentives among member states [emphasis added].
Towards an Antarctic blue carbon marine protected area
The need to protect and preserve Antarctic blue carbon is undeniably important and urgently needed. In
such a scenario it is preferable to work within existing treaty regimes. Even if the global community had
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an appetite for new institutions, there is no certainty about how long it would take or whether it would lead
to the weakening, rather than strengthening, of Antarctic governance, with important implications for the
global climate.
Importantly, while the existing ATS regime may not provide automatic protection for Antarctic blue carbon, it
can be operationalized to do so; that is, so long as the political will exists to collaboratively commit to conserva-
tion measures. Pragmatically, the less conﬂict there is with state and commercial interests, the more traction
conservation eﬀorts will likely have. One possibility is to seek protection for only those zones of blue carbon
that have become ice-free after a set date, for instance the 1992 adoption of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the 2015 adoption of the Paris Agreement. Either would include
the new sink formed by the calving of the Larsen C iceberg, estimated to be worth a million tonnes a blue
carbon annually.2
Isolating blue carbon protection to new zones of retraction may deal with the problem of existing national
interests. However, the history of CCAMLR MPA diplomacy suggests that future ﬁshing potential in these zones
will be at the forefront of any negotiations to conserve them. Indeed, even the 2017 ice-carve area SASS that has
been deﬁned has been premised on states being allowed to ﬁsh in these newly ice-free zones. We accept the
concern over future use is a more diﬃcult obstacle to overcome, but one which may be possible if a way is found
to allow states to count some or all of the sequestration potential of Antarctic blue carbon zones as part of their
international obligation to mitigate their carbon emissions under the Paris Agreement.
The potential of the Paris Agreement
Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, states are to ‘nationally determine’ their contributions to international climate
change mitigation, adaptation and resilience eﬀorts (Art 4). These nationally determined contributions (NDCs)
are designed to be iterative and ﬂexible, with the expectation that various forms of domestic transition will
allow each country to ‘ratchet up’ their NDCs over time.
The Paris Agreement also encourages cooperative approaches to carbon reduction. Article 6(1) of the Agree-
ment permits parties to:
pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition
in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity.
Importantly, the Paris Agreement does not specify the form of activity which may give rise to cooperative miti-
gation outcomes, nor the mechanism for its accounting. Any cooperative activity – or indeed cessation of
activity – programme, scheme or policy which results in demonstrable carbon mitigation is potentially able
to contribute to NDCs. In this respect the Agreement envisions (Art 6(8)):
integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches being available to Parties to assist in the implementation of their
nationally determined contributions.
To that end, Article 6.9 of the Paris Agreement establishes a non-market-approach (NMA) framework designed
to, inter alia, ‘enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements’
(Art 6.8) As noted, that may include, as part of the state party obligations set out within the UNFCCC text, miti-
gation outcomes that result from cooperative conservation and enhancement of biomass, coastal and marine
ecosystems; namely, blue carbon. (Art 4.1(d))
In this case, states would need to show that cooperatively restricting or prohibiting ﬁshing or other industrial
activities in blue carbon zones generates demonstrable additional greenhouse gas sink activity compared to a
projected ‘business as usual’ approach.6 As discussed, signiﬁcant scientiﬁc evidence already exists to show this
will be the case. Further work, however, is needed to project biomass development in zones of sea ice retraction,
calculate present and future carbon-sequestration value of that biomass, and attribute the additional beneﬁts of
leaving it in place to those states who cooperatively agree to do so.
As of yet, conceptual and common guidelines for NMAs are yet to be agreed by the Paris Agreement parties.
In fact, uncertainty and disagreement about Article 6 at the Katowice Climate Conference in December 2018
meant that no common vision has been achieved for Article 6 under the Paris Rulebook.
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Further discussion on common guidelines on NMAs is expected at the 2019 Madrid Climate Conference,
under the Presidency of Chile. The present lack of clarity around NMAs, in combination with the receptiveness
to innovative approaches under the Paris Agreement more generally, indicate the timing may be right to explore
options for an Antarctic blue carbon NMA framework. Notably, on the ATS side, those states who have slowed
progress on adoption of MPAs in the Southern Ocean (: See note 54) are also leading carbon emitters and under
international pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and set ambitious NDCs (Hilton & Kerr, 2016; Martus,
2018). We therefore propose to allow CCAMLR parties to count Antarctic blue carbon sequestration towards
their NDCs; doing so could provide a relatively low cost but politically attractive incentive for protecting Antarc-
tic blue carbon.
Towards a blue carbon NMA
Given the ﬂexibility and adaptability of the Paris Agreement, a cross-institutional NMA platform connecting it to
the ATS need not be overly prescriptive at the outset. Like the ‘ratcheting up’ of commitments, an NMA platform
could have the capacity to be reﬁned over time, as scientiﬁc and policy knowledge and indeed ecosystem ser-
vices develop. Indeed, inter-regime carbon under an Antarctic blue carbon NMA could be delayed to allow
scientiﬁc evidence to be gathered under the current or modiﬁed CCAMLR Special Areas for Scientiﬁc Study.
However, we urge current work towards an NMA platform that is capable of assessing:
. The estimated ecosystem service of blue carbon zones at any one time – based on current mapping survey
techniques to identify and measure standing stocks of carbon in marine marine organisms, by habitat, by
major area (Barnes & Sands, 2017; Barnes, Sands, Richardson, & Smith, 2019);
. The ‘business as usual’ level of marine resource harvesting that would ordinarily be permissible in these
zones;
. The amount of carbon which would remain– and therefore be stored in the seaﬂoor – if that harvesting was
to occur; and
. By consequence, the relative amount of carbon each CCAMLR ﬁshing state preserves for long term seques-
tration by agreeing to forego or restrict ﬁshing activities in the proposed areas of blue carbon protection.
Beyond the broad platform elements suggested above, it is beyond the scope of this paper to formulate the
technical mechanics of carbon accounting or transfer between regimes. That is a future task, one that would
require both political commitments, but also dedicated research, negotiation and commitment from both
regimes. That said, there are some basic structural and institutional issues that would need to be dealt to pro-
gress such an NMA.
Attribution and additionality
Firstly, any accounting regime would need to be based on genuine limits upon harvesting by states who would
have otherwise ﬁshed in blue carbon zones. Clearly all states of the world could not claim mitigation outcomes,
otherwise it would dilute the incentive for blue carbon protection, if not neutralize it altogether. Relatedly, ensur-
ing additionality of enhanced carbon sinks and preventing double-counting of emission abatement eﬀorts are
common concerns within international climate change policy and an ongoing theme of Article 6 Rulebook
negotiations (Schneider & Theuer, 2018).
Carbon leakage
Another potential issue is the potential for carbon leakage, in that there might be an incentive for a state that
foregoes ﬁshing activity (and thereby enhances blue carbon sinks) to then simply allow its emissions to increase
in other ways (e.g. by reducing domestic eﬀorts at emissions abatement). Avoiding carbon leakage would need
to be a key design element of an eﬀective NMA platform. This might be achieved, for instance, by states declar-
ing enhanced carbon sink activities (from NMA platforms) as a distinct element of their NDCs under the Paris
Agreement. That way, there should be limited opportunity for interchangeability between NMA activity in
enhancing blue carbon sinks and emissions abatement at home.
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Coordination across instruments
On the ATS side, an eﬀective Antarctic blue carbon NMA would necessarily involve the participation of CCAMLR.
CCAMLR is in a unique and powerful position to respond to climate change trends and predict future climate con-
ditions in the Southern Ocean (Christian, 2018). It has an even stronger technical capacity to research, study, map
and monitor living marine resources in the Southern Ocean. (i.e. CCAMLR, Art IX(1)) It also has the expertise and
resources to map and attribute ecosystem service contributions arising from cessation of harvesting. CCAMLR
might, for instance, contribute to, or endorse, attribution claims on a Paris Agreement based register; one
restricted to the CCAMLR area of the Southern Ocean, or potentially in respect of all areas beyond national juris-
diction. Alternatively, CCAMLRmight be the host institution for an NMA framework for blue carbon accounting as
part of a coordinated, cross-instrument approach as envisioned under Paris Agreement Article 6.8 and 6.9.
One of the major roadblocks to CCAMLR involvement in carbon accounting might come from within that
body itself. As with other ATS bodies, CCAMLR has tended to operate in a silo, and especially at arm’s length
from the wider United Nations system (Christian, 2018). Indeed, outside of the 2009 Resolution 30/XXVIII,
CCAMLR has subsequently undertaken little in the way of inter- or intra-regime cooperation with other ATS
organizations, or with the UN climate change regime (Hughes & Grant, 2017). That said, there has been a
renewed emphasis on building collaborative frameworks over the last decade, much of which has been
driven by the Scientiﬁc Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) (Hughes et al., 2018).
Regime bridging
SCAR is an interdisciplinary body established independently of, and prior to, the ATS (Summerhayes, 2008).
Given its history and contribution to knowledge about Antarctic systems and governance, SCAR plays an
active role in observing and providing expert advice to CCAMLR, Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (Antarc-
tic Treaty) and Committee for Environmental Protection bodies (Madrid Protocol, 1991, Art 11(4)). Importantly
SCAR has oﬃcial observer status at meetings of the Paris Agreement and UNFCCC and also participates in meet-
ings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in an ad hocmanner through its parent body the
International Science Council. As Hughes et al. (2018) note:
Ultimately, eﬀorts to enhance Antarctic environmental protection would be further strengthened by developing greater syner-
gies between the governance bodies on the one hand and the science community on the other hand. Fortunately, there are
mechanisms already in place linking scientiﬁc evidence to governance, with SCAR playing a key role.
Those essential characteristics would also make SCAR a key nexus body to link science evidence about the eco-
system service of Antarctic blue carbon within global governance and an essential component of an ATS/Paris
Agreement NMA framework.
Conclusion
As we have discussed, the rapid change to Antarctica’s coastlines is both a consequence of climate change and a
potential buﬀer against its progress. Much will depend on the governance decisions we make now and whether
they ultimately focus on the conservation opportunities or commercial values of the emergent blue carbon in
newly ice-free areas. The history of MPA negotiation suggests that Antarctica’s very nature as a complex marine
ecosystem will act as a disincentive to its protection. Equally challenging will be the scale of what needs to be
conserved. Predicted blue carbon areas around the Antarctic coastline are vast, dwarﬁng the size of the few
MPAs that have been agreed to date. Blue-carbon protection requires that we consider more than one strata
or isolated area; benthic sea-life supports and is supported by a complex ecosystem which is expanding, and
in ﬂux. Truly maximizing its negative feedback capacity will require ecosystem-wide protection, most of
which has not been studied to even a baseline level of understanding.
As we have shown, barriers to conservation will likely be political and diplomatic in nature. Given what is at
stake, it is important to deal with such barriers head on rather than hoping that states will put global interests
above their own. That simply hasn’t been the experience to date, either in the ATS framework, or within the UN
climate change regime. Perceptions about and concerns for economics and inequity are common in both, and
solutions must take account of these issues from the outset or risk further failures.
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We have presented one promising way forward; one that seeks to counterbalance the potential for resistance
from ﬁshing states through the incentivisation of carbon crediting from ice-melt areas around the Antarctic
coastline. Whether this is enough of an incentive is uncertain, but the timing and the circumstances suggest
it is worth exploring the opportunities presented by the as-yet-uncharted Article 6 of the Paris Agreement,
especially in relation to ‘integrated, holistic and balanced’ mitigation eﬀorts aimed to ‘enable opportunities
for coordination across instruments’.
We emphasize that an inter-regime NMA to account for Antarctic blue carbon should not be viewed as an
alternative to domestic NDC commitments. Rather, the proposal recognizes the real potential of emergent
Antarctic blue carbon for global mitigation eﬀorts. It also recognizes that achieving that aim
involves certain states foregoing short term domestic commercial interests. What is being given up may
be a future interest, but it is undeniably a lucrative one, which will become more commercially attractive
as global ﬁsh stocks decline and the Southern Ocean becomes easier to exploit by technological means.
It seems appropriate to ﬁnd a way to account for such concessions. As noted, CCAMLR conservation
measures have been most readily adopted when they are viewed as equitable and ensure an ‘alignment
of incentives’ amongst the parties. In many ways, this is what the refocusing of the Paris Agreement is
about; encouraging compliance by providing everyone with carrots, rather than just threatening a small
group with sticks.
Notes
1. That includes the designation of the opening and closing of areas, regions or sub-regions for purposes of scientiﬁc study or
conservation, including special areas for protection and scientiﬁc study: see CCAMLR Art IX(1)(f) & Art IX(2)(g).
2. The jurisdictional limits on CCAMLR rational use considerations arise in part as a result to concerns about the clash of the
CCAMLR with other ﬁsheries treaties outside north of 60S during its negotiation. Further, while Antarctica’s and Antarctic
systems’ contribution to the global environment – including oceans, climate and atmosphere – was already recognised at
the time of drafting in the 1970s, the focus of the parties centred on ﬁshing and there was little conceptual engagement
with how massive ecosystem changes within the convention area might occur in the near future that would alter its global
ecosystem role. See ATCM, ‘Summary of Preliminary Views Expressed by Delegations to the Second Extended Prepatory
Meeting on the Question Posed in the United State’s Paper ANT/EPM/6 on Antarctic Marine Living Resources Issues’ Antarctic
Treaty IXth Consultative Meeting ANT/EPM2/5 27 July 1977; ATCM Final Meeting report Antarctic Treaty Report of Ninth Con-
sultative Meeting, 23, 29, 42, 45, 74.
3. n.b no new ASMAs have been agreed since 2014 meaning this data remains current at the time of publication.
4. This is, in part due to the fact that the nominating party is responsible for managing the protected area.
5. Currently there are 72 ASPAs, with 8 having a marine component. See Wauchope, Shaw, and Terauds (2019).
6. Additionality has been a longstanding and persistent issue in global emissions agreements, and the source of much debate in
relation to the voluntary mechanisms established by Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Concerns over experience with addition-
ality under the Kyoto Protocol and its Clean Development Mechanism have indeed stalled the ﬁnalisation of an agreed mech-
anism to date (Schneider & Theuer, 2018).
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